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Summary findings
It is easy to  say that  the  International  Monetary  Fund  provisions  and that,  given the international  financial
should  not resort  to financial  rescue  for countries  in  institutions'  newfound  resolve  to "bail  in" investors,  they
crisis;  this is hard to do when there is no alternative.  now regard these  clauses  with trepidation.
That is where  collective action clauses come in.  Extending their data to 1999, Eichengreen and Mody
Collective  action  clauses  are designed  to facilitate  debt  find  no evidence  of such  changes  but rather the same
restructuring  by the principals  - borrowers  and lenders  pattern as before:  Collective  action clauses  raise the costs
- with minimal intervention by international financial  of borrowing for low-rated issuers but reduce them for
institutions.  issuers  with good credit ratings.
Despite  much discussion  of this option, there has been  Their results  hold  both for the full set of bonds and for
little action.  Issuers  of bonds fear that collective  action  bonds issued  only  by sovereigns.
clauses  would  raise  borrowing  costs.  They  argue that these results  should reassure  those
Eichengreen  and Mody update earlier  findings  about  who regard  collective  action  clauses  as an important
tlle  impact  of  collective  action  clauses  on borrowing  element  in the campaign  to  strengthen  international
costs.  It has  been argued  that only in the past  year or so  financial  architecture.
have  investors  focused  on the presence  of these
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The literature on strengthening the international  financial  system is replete with proposals
for scaling  back the role of the international  financial  institutions and, in particular, limiting  their
resort to financial  rescues of countries in crisis. Whenever IMF money is used to pay off foreign
investors in order to prevent their rush for the exits from bringing financial  markets crashing
down, taxpayers in the crisis country are left holding the bag; since the IMF is paid back, it is the
residents of the low-income country who incur the financial  and economic costs of the crisis,
while foreign investors are let off scot free. As redistribution to the rich from the poor, this
outcome is wanting on equity grounds. It is also inefficient:  IMF rescues that regularly allow
investors to escape crises create moral hazard - they encourage investors to lend without due
regard to the risks. And lending without regard to the risks only sets the stage for additional
crises.
While it is easy to say that the IMF should not resort to financial  rescues, this is hard to do
so long as there does not exist an alternative  for responding to crises in emerging markets. This is
where collective-action  clauses come in. Collective-action  clauses are designed to facilitate debt
restructuring by the principals -- by the borrowers and lenders involved -- with minimal
intervention  by the international  financial  institutions. Unfortunately, market-based debt
restructuring is difficult  when the bonds involved are issued under U.S. law. Most American-style
bonds lack sharing clauses to discourage maverick investors from resorting to lawsuits and other
ways of obstructing settlements beneficial to the debtor and the majority of creditors. They
require the unanimous  consent of bondholders to any restructuring, creating almost
insurmountable  hurdles to orderly negotiations to alter payment terms. They lack clauses
specifying  who represents the bondholders and making provision for a bondholders committee orassembly. All this makes market-based debt restructuring extremely difficult  to pursue.
The addition of sharing, majority-voting  and collective-representation  clauses to bond
contracts was thus suggested by the GIO following  the Mexican crisis and echoed in a series of
G7 and G22 reports and declarations (see Group of Ten 1996, Group of Twenty-Two 1998,
Group of Seven 1998). The G-7 then placed the issue on its work program for reforming the
international  financial  system. U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin endorsed it in a speech
designed to set the agenda for the spring 1999 meetings of the IMF's Interim Committee (Rubin
1999). G7 finance  ministers embraced it in their Cologne Summit report on strengthening the
international  financial  architecture (Group of Seven 1999).
Yet all this talk has resulted in little action. Issuers fear that collective-action  clauses
would raise borrowing costs.  Easier restructuring, by heightening  the temptation for borrowers to
walk away from their debts, would render investors reluctant to lend. On the other hand, clauses
which facilitate orderly restructuring in the event of exceptional difficulties  could render
emerging-market  issues more attractive by minimizing  acrimonious disputes, difficult negotiations,
and extended periods when no debt service is paid and growth is depressed by a suffocating debt
overhang. The analogy with domestic bankruptcy procedures can be invoked in support of this
more favorable interpretation.
Potential issuers are waiting, it would appear, for more evidence on which argument is
correct.  The obvious source of evidence is the stock of bonds governed by UK law, and therefore
including collective-action  clauses, already issued and traded in the markets.  Comparisons of the
spreads on these bonds with spreads on otherwise equivalent American-style  instruments offer a
2concrete way of evaluating  the afore-mentioned  arguments.!
In a previous paper (Eichengreen  and Mody 2000) we analyzed  some 2,000 international
bonds issued by emerging-market  borrowers between 1991 and 1998 in an effort to uncover the
answer. The results suggested that while  collective-action  clauses  raise costs of borrowing for
low-rated issuers,  they reduce them for issuers with high credit ratings. Our interpretation  was
that while  more credit-worthy issuers in fact benefit from being able to avail themselves of orderly
restructuring in the event of exceptional circumstances,  for less credit-worthy borrowers the
advantages  of provisions enabling  restructuring are offset by the moral hazard and default risk
associated with the presence of renegotiation-friendly  loan provisions. We argued that this is a
promising  result from the point of view of the architecture  debate. If the goal is to strengthen
market discipline  by encouraging investors to more generously  reward more credit-worthy
borrowers and penalize less credit-worthy ones, then the more widespread adoption of collective-
action clauses, which would reduce borrowing costs for the more credit-worthy  while raising
them for their less credit-worthy counterparts, would seem to be a step in the right direction.
This result has met with less than universat acceptance. As Fischer (1999, p.10) has put
it, 'This is a more subtle outcome than the one I expected." Further results would appear to be
needed to reassure the skeptics.
'The comparison is complicated, as we explain below, since not only does one have to control for
borrower characteristics and market conditions, but the choice of governing law is presumably
endogenous.  And, in addition, there is the fact that not all borrowers will be in the market at all
times. But this is still the obvious source of evidence  on the question.
3In addition, there is the suspicion that the relationship  between contractual provisions and
spreads may have shifted  since the international  policy community  acknowledged  the need for the
participation  of the private sector in crisis resolution. Provisions  which may have been wholly
disregarded or may even have been regarded favorably  so long as it was assumed that they would
only be invoked under extraordinary  circumnstances  may have come to be seen less favorably  now
that the IFIs are actively  seeking to "bail in" the private sector.
Finally,  there is the question of whether results that hold for the universe  of emerging
market issuers hold for sovereigns alone. On the one hand there is the argument that collective-
action clauses  are especially  desirable for sovereign  issues, because there do not exist other
mechanisms  (domestic bankruptcy and insolvency  procedures) for orderly restructuring in the
event of default, like those which apply to corporate bond issues. On the other hand there is the
fear that moral hazard may  be a particular problem for sovereigns precisely  because they are not
subject to the jurisdiction  of the bankruptcy  court.
The purpose of this note is therefore to update our previous findings  on the effects of
collective-action  provisions. We add 118 additional  observations for the first half of 1999. We
present separate results for sovereigns (at the same dropping Israel, whose bonds enjoy a special
U.S. government  guarantee). The results support the robustness of our previous findings. We
continue to find that the presence of collective-action  clauses  raises spreads for borrowers with
poor credit ratings while  reducing spreads for borrowers with good credit. This pattern is not
weakened by the addition of data for 1999. And the same pattern holds for sovereigns as for
other issuers.
42.  Data and Specification
Our data, drawn from Capital Bondware and augmented for the early 1990s by the
International  Monetary Fund's Emerging Market Group, is composed of 2774 bonds. 2 1209 of
these bonds were subject to UK governing  law, 894 to U.S. law, and the rest to other (mainly
Japanese and German) laws. 3 We show the breakdown by governing  law, in annual average form
for various subperiods,  in Table 1.
Since  the choice of governing law is plausibly  endogenous, we estimate the determinants
of spreads using modified instrument variables. We first use a multinominal  logit to determine the
choice of governing  law, where US, UK and other are the three alternatives. (The logit results for
choice of governing  law are reported in Table 2.) We construct the fitted probability  that a
particular bond is governed by one of these laws and use the estimated  probabilities  rather than
the actual values in our second-stage regression.  Since the spread will be observed only when
positive decisions  to borrow and lend are made, we estimate (by maximum  likelihood)  a sample
selection model, made up of an issue equation and a spread equation. The two equations are
identified  by the nonlinearity  of the fitted probabilities  in the selection equation and by the
2In principle, this is the universe of all fixed and floating rate bonds issued in the sample period by
emerging markets. More detail on the succeeding paragraphs is provided in the data appendix to
Eichengreen and Mody (2000).
'For a number of bonds, no law was specified. We have included them in the "other" laws
category. Also, three bonds had both UK and U.S. laws. We have categorized these as U.S. law
bonds (though none of our results is sensitive to this procedure).
5inclusion  of variables  determining issuance  that do not also influence  spreads.
We estimate this model using data for primary spreads for developing-country  bonds
issued in the period 1991-QI through 1999-QII. We gathered the maturity of each issue, whether
it was privately  placed, whether the issuer was a private or governmental  entity, whether the issue
was denominated  in dollars, yen or deutschmarks,  whether the interest rate was fixed or floating,
and the governing  law. As measures of creditworthiness  we included the external debt relative to
GNP, debt service relative to exports, a dummy  variable  for whether the country had concluded a
debt restructuring agreement with private or official  creditors in the preceding year, international
reserves relative to short-term debt, the ratio of short-term debt to total commercial  bank debt,
the ratio of outstanding bank credit to the private sector relative to GDP, the growth rate of real
GDP, the variance of the export growth rate, the ratio of short-term debt to total commercial
bank debt, the ratio of reserves to short-term debt, and the ratio of domestic private credit to
GDP.  We also included a measure of political risk derived from Institutional Investor: the
residual from a first-stage regression in which the credit rating was regressed on the ratio of debt
to GNP, the debt rescheduling  dummy,  the ratio of reserves to GNP, the rate of GDP growth, and
the variance of export growth. Finally,  to proxy for industrial-country  credit conditions, we used
the yield on ten-year U.S. treasury bonds and the difference  between the ten-year and one-year
U.S. treasury rates. 4
Estimating  the issuance equation requires information  on those who did not issue bonds.
4Ten-year  rates are appropriate since the term to maturity of the underlying asset roughly coincides
with that on the international bonds in our sample.
6For this purpose, we distinguished  three types of issuers: sovereign, public, and private, and for
each quarter and country where one of these issuers did not come to the market, we recorded a
zero (and where they did we recorded a one).
3. Updating the Basic Results
Table 3 reports the basic results. 5 These estimates differ from those in our previous paper
by virtue of the availability  of data for 1999 and, therefore, additional  observations. In addition,
unlike the previous paper, we drop the observations for IsraeL since Israeli government bonds
enjoy special U.S. government guarantees, which presumably  affect their spreads. While
dropping these observations strikes us as appropriate, it turns out that none of our results is
affected  by their inclusion. Given both additions and subtractions, we now have 2306
observations. 6
Country and borrower characteristics  enter with signs and coefficients little changed from
those in our previous paper.  Borrowers from fast growing-countries with little political risk pay
relatively low spreads, as before, while borrowers from countries with a recent history of debt-
servicing difficulties  pay high ones. The critical variable is the dummy  for UK (versus U.S.) law.
Its coefficient  is negative but insignificantly  different from zero at standard confidence levels.
But when we distinguish  between more and less credit-worthy borrowers, we obtain
5These  correct for both the endogeneity  of the choice of governing  law and the selectivity associated
with the borrowing decision.
6Up from 2217 in our previous paper.
7sharper results. In columns 2 and 3 we interact the dummy  variables  for governing  law (or the
predicted probabilities  of issuance under a particular law) with four credit-rating categories. 7
There is a strong negative coefficient  on UK law for borrowers from the most credit-worthy
countries. The coefficient  on the interaction term differs significantly  from zero at the 95 per cent
confidence  level. A chi-squared test indicates  that the sum of the coefficients  differs from zero at
the 95 per cent confidence  level.
An explanation  for this pattern is as follows. More credit-worthy emerging-market
borrowers value their capital-market access and are unlikely  to walk away from their debts.
Including  collective-action  clauses in their loan contracts is not a significant  source of moral
hazard. Indeed, in the exceptional circumstance  that they have difficulties  in servicing  their debts,
the fact that they can resort to provisions facilitating  the orderly restructuring of their obligations
is viewed positively  by the markets. For less credit-worthy borrowers, in contrast, the presence of
collective-action  clauses significantly  aggravates moral hazard and increases borrowing costs.
Still, the fact that collective-action  clauses allow such borrowers to restructure in a more orderly
fashion is attractive to their creditors. The two effects tend to work in opposite directions,
resulting in a relatively smnall  and insignificant  overall impact on borrowing costs.
Based on the regressions in columns  2 and 3, we estimate that the presence of collective
action clauses  raises spreads by 150 basis points for borrowers from countries with low credit
ratings, while lowering  them by 53 basis points from countries with high ratings. Both figures are
7The omitted alternative is the lowest rating category  (0-30 on the Institutional Investor scale).
Note that these  are the unadjusted credit ratings, not the residuals  from our political-risk regressions.
8calculated  at the average value of the log of the spread for the respective category. These are not
insignificant  effects relative to a typical  emerging-market  spread of 600 basis points.
4.  Results for Sovereigns Alone
In our previous paper, we did not estimate the effect of choice of governing  law separately
for sovereigns. There is an argument  that the results should not differ, namely  the sovereign
ceiling,  that spreads on private bonds cannot fall below the ceiling  established by spreads on
sovereign  bonds. Anything which pushes down spreads for private borrowers (e.g. for borrowers
with good credit ratings) should also push down the spreads  for sovereign  borrowers (and
conversely  for borrowers from countries with poor credit ratings). We suspect that this view
takes the notion of the sovereign  ceiling  too literally;  in any case, the sovereign  ceiling  has been
breeched in a growing number of cases in recent quarters.
More interesting  are arguments  about moral hazard and renegotiation costs specific  to
sovereign debt. Since those who issue such instruments  enjoy sovereign immunity,  the moral
hazard created by renegotiation-friendly  provisions may be even greater than for other borrowers;
this should  render collective-action  clauses less attractive. On the other hand, given the
inapplicability  of even domestic bankruptcy and insolvency  procedures to sovereigns (no
provision for cramdown, for example),  provisions facilitating  orderly restructuring, and therefore
collective-action  clauses, may be more attractive than in the case of other debts. Again, the
question is an empirical  one.
The second set of regressions is for sovereigns only (again excluding Israel). Again we
9distinguish  borrowers with credit ratings above 50 and below 50. The coefficient  on UK
governing law for low-rated sovereigns is 0.39, with a t-statistic of 1.74, significantly  different
from zero at the 10 per cent confidence  level (two-tail test).  This is indistinguishable  from the
previous coefficient  (for the sample comnprised  of sovereigns and other borrowers alike of 0.40).
For high-rated sovereigns, the coefficient  on UK governing law is -1.  11, but has a t-statistic of
only 1.11 (not surprisingly  given the small  number of observations). This is, however, strikingly
similar  to the full-sample  coefficient  of 1.04. The impact on spreads, again calculated  at the
average value of the log of the spread for the respective category, suggests that the presence of
collective action clauses raises spreads by 130 basis points for low-rated sovereigns (recall that
the full sample equivalent  was 150 basis points), while lowering  them by 53 basis points for
countries with high ratings, the same as before.
The limitation  of this test is that we have only 402 observations  for low-rated sovereign
borrowers and 40 observations  for high-rated sovereign  borrowers, compared to which the
number  of parameters to be estimated is large. This suggests an alternative approach: to estimate
the model for sovereign  and other borrowers together but to allow the coefficients  on the
governing  laws to differ  between them (while  constraining  the other coefficients to be the same
for sovereigns  and other borrowers, as in Table 3).  In other words, we take the specification  in
Table 3 and add a set of interaction terms between sovereign  status and choice of governing  law
(the fitted value of the latter, as before). If the same  results hold for sovereigns as for other
borrowers, we expect the coefficients  on the governing  laws to have the same signs and
significance  levels  to be unchanged and the newly-added  interaction terms to enter with
10coefficients  that differ insignificantly  from zero.
This is what we find. The coefficients on UK governing law have the same signs as before
(positive for low-rated borrowers, negative for high-rated borrowers) and both differ from zero at
the 99 per cent confidence level. Neither interaction term for sovereigns approaches significance
at conventional  confidence levels. 8
Thus, we find little difference  in the results between sovereigns and other borrowers. It
may be that both the attractions of orderly restructuring and problems of moral hazard are in fact
more pronounced for sovereigns but that, since they work in opposite directions, their effects
cancel out. 9
4.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper has updated and extended our previous findings concerning the impact of
collective-action  clauses on borrowing costs. Those earlier results are robust to the addition of
data for 1999, when the markets plausibly  began to focus on possible adverse implications of
these provisions in the context of the IFI's new bail-in strategy. And we find that the same results
8That  for high-rated sovereigns has a t-statistic of 0.82, that for low-rated sovereigns a t-statistic of
1.48.
9That we find the same results for nonsovereign borrowers alone (which we have verified in
additional regressions, not reported here) raises interesting issues of its own.  It is sometimes
suggested that collective-action clauses should be of interest only to sovereign borrowers, since for
nonsovereigns the bankruptcy court has the power to cram down settlement terms on maverick
creditors even under U.S. law.  On the other hand, actual bankruptcy is likely to be an expensive
alternative. The fact that a considerable number of nonsovereigns  borrow using instruments subject
to UK law suggests that U.S.-style bonds may create problems even for nonsovereigns.  Buchheit
and Gulati (2000) suggest reasons why this might be the case.
1  1obtain for sovereigns as for all borrowers.
If these findings  - and our interpretation of them  - is correct, then progress in
strengthening the international  financial  architecture should proceed through market behavior at
the national level as much as official action at the international  level. We should observe a
growing number of borrowers with favorable credit ratings, governments in particular, adopting
collective action clauses because they recognize these as being in their self interest.  At the
beginning  of 2000, the United Kingdom quietly included a collective-action clause in one of its
international  bonds. In April Canada announced that it planned to do the same in its future bond
issues (Martin 2000). The question now is whether others will follow.
12Table 1: Number of bonds by governing law (annual average rate of issuance)
1991-1997  1998  1999-Q1,Q2
Private issuers
UK governing  law  102  29  46
US governing  law  69  66  58
Other governing  laws  27  11  20
Pub]ic issuers
UK governing  law  35  14  18
US governing  law  20  15  10
Other governing  laws  26  9  32
Sovereign issuers
UK governing  law  18  30  36
US governing  law  15  31  48
Other governing  laws  26  28  28
Note: annual  rate of issuance derived by dividing  total number  of issues in the period 1991-1997
by seven and multiplying  the number of issues in the first half of 1999 by two.
Source: see text.
13Table  2: Multinominal  logits for choice of governing law
Variable  UK governing law  Other governing  laws
Log Amount  -0.47  -0.71
(-6.04)  (-7.24)
Maturity  -0.12  -0.13
(-6.92)  (-6.26)
Private  placement  -0.32  -0.82
(-2.89)  (-5.13)
Log of 10 year US. Treasury Rate  0.54  1.17
(0.94)  (1.57)
Log (10 year - I year) Treasury Rate  0.38  0.76
(4.20)  (5.97)
Credit Rating Residual  -0.02  0.006
(-2.55)  (0.65)
Debt/GNP  -1.86  -0.63
(-3.89)  (-1.01)
Debt Service/Exports  0.42  1.28
(0.88)  (1.92)
GDP Growth  -6.22  -25.88
(-0.79)  (-2.63)
Standard Deviation  of Export Growth  -1.18  -0.02
(-1.32)  (-0.02)
Ratio of Short Term Debt to Total Debt  1.94  -0.32
(2.59)  (-0.34)
Reserves/Short  Term Debt  -0.09  0.02
(-1.31)  (-0.29)
Reserves/Import  0.28  0.08
(4.17)  (0.91)
Ratio of Domestic Credit to GDP  -0.22  0.23
(-3.26)  (2.72)
Dummy for:
Putlic Borrower  -0.77  -0.92
(-1.89)  (-2.09)
Private Borrower  -1.19  -1.58
(-2.80)  (-3.36)
Supranational  borrower  0.03  -1.04
(0.04)  (-0.98)
Latin America  -1.43  -1.33
(-6.03)  (-4.21)
Japanese Yen issue  2.18  4.05
(6.45)  (11.74)
Deutch Mark issue  2.25  5.30
(5.71)  (13.38)
Other currencies'issue  2.12  3.58
(7.82)  (12.16)
Fixed rate issue  -1.90  -0.65
(-11.00)  (-2.81)
Manufacturing  Sector  0.24  -0.21
(0.94)  (-0.62)
Financial Services  Sector  0.34  -0.14
(2.07)  (-0.63)
Other Services  -0.06  0.36
(-0.21)  (1.01)
Government  entities  -0.52  -0.68
(-1.27)  (-1.51)
Constant  4.73  2.78
(3.48)  (1.60)
Number of bonds  2660  2660
Pseudo R-square  0.35  0.35
Log of Likelihood  -1833.77  -1833.77
*  US. Governing  law is used as the base.
14Table 3: Impact  of governing  laws for different  credit  rating  categories
Full Sample  Sovereign Borrowers  Only
Variable  All  Credit  Credit  All  Credit  Credit
rating <50  rating  >50  rating  <50  rating >50
LogAmount  -0.05  -0.05  -0.11  0.02  0.01  -0.40
(-2.74)  (-2.65)  (-2.99)  (0.57)  (0.48)  (-1.83)
Maturity  -0.0007  .0046  0.0002  0.01  0.005  -0.02
(-0.29)  (1.85)  (0.06)  (1.63)  (1.35)  (-0.98)
Private  placement  0.09  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.08  -0.91
(2.85)  (2.17)  (1.37)  (1.72)  (1.72)  (-3.55)
Log of IO  year  US. Treasury  Rate  -0.37  -0.43  -0.27  -0.28  -0.39  1.55
(-2.55)  (-3.04)  (-0.95)  (-1.13)  (-1.56)  (1.55)
Log (10 year - I year) Treasury  Rate  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.08
(-1.40)  (-1.43)  (-0.51)  (-0.54)  (-0.36)  (-0.48)
Credit  Rating  Residual  -0.04  -0.03  -0.08  -0.03  -0.04  -0.06
(-16.63)  (-11.11)  (-15.89)  (-6.52)  (-8.17)  (-1.75)
DebtVGNP  1.37  1.62  1.02  0.86  1.29  1.45
(12.53)  (12.72)  (5.12)  (4.61)  (6.30)  (1.34)
Debt Rescheduled  in Previous  Year  0.17  0.10  -0.04  -0.02
(3.88)  (2.71)  (-0.47)  (-0.24)
GDP  Growth  -13.05  -7.07  -39.30  -11.47  -12.83  -29.08
(-6.84)  (-3.88)  (-7.24)  (-4.09)  (-4.60)  (-1.73)
Standard  Deviation  of Export  Growth  2.07  1.76  4.05  1.40  1.39  11.32
(10.00)  (9.26)  (5.67)  (5.31)  (5.43)  (5.33)
Short  Terrn  to Total  Debt  0.69  0.65  0.81  0.25  0.50  -1.27
(3.88)  (3.53)  (1.89)  (0.93)  (1.89)  (-0.85)
Reserves/Short  Term  Debt  -0.0007  -0.05  0.08  -0.05  -0.06  0.06
(-0.05)  (-4.05)  (2.53)  (-2.58)  (-3.15)  (0.65)
Ratio  of Dornestic  Credit  to GDP  -0.07  -0.18  -0.16  -0.06  -0.10  0.19
(-3.69)  (-7.26)  (-4.30)  (-1.58)  (-2.27)  (.I  9)
Dummuy  for:
UK Govening Law*  -0.08  0.40  -1.04  0.22  0.39  -1.11
(-0.54)  (2.86)  (-3.49)  (0.88)  (1.74)  (-1.  1)
UK Govening Law Interactions  With:
Rating  30-50  -0.08  0.14
(-0.88)  (0.86)
Rating 50-70  0.15  -0.34
(1.20)  (-0.89)
Rating  70-90  -0.34
(-2.32)
Other  Goveming  Law*  0.12  0.01  -0.91  -0.11  -0.26  -4.93
(0.44)  (0.06)  (-2.20)  (-0.24)  (-0.90)  (-2.41)
Other Governing  Law Interactions  With:
Rating 30-50  -0.28  -0.24
(-1.53)  (-0.81)
Rating 50-70  -0.82  -0.98
-3.98  (-2.80)
Rating  70-90  -0.65
(-2.70)
Constant  5.76  5.47  7.57  5.64  5.50  5.18
(16.41)  (14.80)  (10.76)  (9.48)  (8.96)  (2.73)
Lambda  -0.58  -0.50  -0.53  -0.54  -0.52  0.03
(-25.22)  (-21.17)  (-10.36)  (-12.82)  (-13.02)  (0.10)
Number  of  bonds  2306  1467  839  442  402  40
Adjusted  R-square
Log of  Likelihood  -4637.078  -2651.377  -1500.81  -960.14  -770.49  -99.38
Note: Dummy  variables  for public,  private,  supranational,  fixed, Latin  America,  currencies,  and
industrial  sectors  are included  in the regression  but not reported  here.
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